Incentive Mechanism and Game Theoretical Model for Crowd Sensing Platforms

Principal Investigator
Hadi Otrok
Department
Electrical & Computer Engineering
Focus Area
Robotics, AI, & Data Science
Incentive Mechanism and Game Theoretical Model for Crowd Sensing Platforms

Recent advancements in technology, along with the rise of the “sharing economy,” has popularized crowd sensing, which is the act of requesting data or services from individuals in the public who perform the task and are then appropriately compensated. An important limitation of crowd sensing is to motivate the workers to perform the tasks at reasonable costs, which ensures a better service for the task requesters, as well as provides fair compensation to the individual participants. These frameworks of crowd sensing also raise an important issue of trustworthiness of the workers and the collected data, which in turn can affect the service provided to the task requester. In this proposal, we present a background in the areas of incentivization and trustworthiness in crowd sensing, along with limitations of existing work in both areas. Additionally, we outline our objectives and suggested research plan to develop an incentive mechanism and game theoretical model for crowd sensing platforms along with the impact of our work. Finally, the required resources and the budget are discussed.

Incentive Mechanism and Game Theoretical Model for Crowd Sensing Platforms